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Payton v. New York'
On January 15, 1970, at 7:30 a.m., New York detectives went to
Theodore Payton's apartment to arrest him for the murder of a gas station
attendant, committed during a robbery. The officers had probable cause
to believe that Payton had committed the crimes, but they had not obtain-
ed a warrant for his arrest. Although no response was received to their
knock on the door, the officers saw light inside the apartment and heard a
radio playing. They entered the apartment by breaking the door open with
a crow bar. Payton was not at home, but the officers seized a .30-caliber
shell casing found on top of a stereo set. Payton later surrendered and was
charged with felony-murder. His motion to suppress the shell casing was
denied on the ground that the warrantless entry was authorized by the New
York Code of Criminal Procedure. 2 Since the entry was thought lawful, the
evidence was held properly seized under the plain view doctrine3 and ad-
mitted at trial. Payton was convicted 4 and the New York Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, affirmed summarily.5
On March 14, 1974, at noon, officers went to Obbie Riddick's apart-
ment to arrest him for two robberies. As in Payton's case, the officers had
1. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
2. At the time of Payton's arrest, warrantless entries to arrest were sanc-
tioned by 66 N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §§ 177-178 (McKinney 1958). This law had
been revised at the time of Riddick's arrest, see text accompanying note 7 infra,
and is found in IlA N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 120.80(4), 140.15(4) (McKinney
1971). For Missouri's statute, see note 59 infra.
3. 445 U.S. at 586-87. Where officers legally enter a residence, items in
plain view may be seized without a warrant. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 465 (1971).
4. People v. Payton, 84 Misc. 2d 973, 376 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct. 1974),
affd mem., 55 A.D.2d 859, 390 N.Y.S.2d 769 (1976), affd, 45 N.Y.2d 300, 380
N.E.2d 224, 408 N.Y.S.2d 395 (1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
5. People v. Payton, 55 A.D.2d 859, 390 N.Y.S.2d 769 (1976) (mem.),
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accumulated enough evidence to establish probable cause to believe Rid-
dick had committed the crimes, but they had not procured an arrest war-
rant. After the officers knocked on the door, Riddick's young son opened it
and the officers observed Riddick sitting in bed. The police then entered
the apartment without consent and arrested Riddick. A search incident to
this arrest resulted in the seizure of narcotics and related paraphernalia.!
Riddick was indicted subsequently on narcotic charges based on the
evidence seized. Riddick's motion to suppress failed because the entry was
authorized by a statutory revision of the New York Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure.7 Furthermore, the search was held "reasonable, " i.e., constitu-
tional under the fourth amendment, 9 under Chimel v. California.10 Rid-
dick was convicted and the supreme court, appellate division, affirmed. I
The New York Court of Appeals, in a single opinion, affirmed both
convictions, upholding the constitutionality of the warrantless entries to
arrest.12 The court reasoned that, while normally warrants are required
before entry into the home is allowed, there is in the entry to arrest situa-
tion a substantial difference in both the degree of intrusion and the gov-
6. Police officers, making.an arrest, have authority to make a warrantless
search of the suspect's person and the area within his immediate control for
weapons or destructible evidence and the officer need not have probable cause to
believe he will find those items. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-68
(1969). If the arrest is illegal, however, then the search is illegal. Beck v. Ohio,
379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). For a comprehensive discussion of this doctrine as it
relates to entries made to arrest, see Kelder & Statman, The Protective Sweep
Doctrine: Recurrent Questions Regarding the Propriety of Searches Conducted
Contemporaneously with an Arrest on or Near Private Premises, 30 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 973 (1979). See also Scope of Search Incident to Arrest: Missouri's Applica-
tion of the Exception, State v. Brasel, 42 MO. L. REV. 668 (1977).
7. See note 2 supra.
8. Since the fourth amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures, courts often use "reasonable" as a synonym for "constitutional." See,
e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 759-65 (1969). "Reasonable" in the
fourth amendment context has a special meaning and "must be viewed in the
light of established Fourth Amendment principles." Id. at 765. See also United
States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 444 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place to be search-
ed, and the persons or things to be seized.
10. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). See note 6 supra.
11. People v. Riddick, 56 A.D.2d 937, 392 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1977), affd, 45
N.Y.2d 300, 380 N.E.2d 224, 408 N.Y.S.2d 395 (1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 573
(1980).
12. People v. Payton, 45 N.Y.2d 300, 312, 380 N.E.2d 224, 230, 408
N.Y.S.2d 395, 401 (1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
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ernmental interests involved. The court viewed entries to arrest as a
"minimal intrusion" and saw no reason to distinguish warrantless arrests in
a residence from those made in a public place. The latter practice had
been held constitutional by the United States Supreme Court in United
States v. Watson.13 Additionally, the court balanced the government's in-
terest in apprehending criminal suspects against the citizen's interest in be-
ing free from governmental intrusion and found the former interest to be
so weighty that such entries are not "unreasonable." Finally, the court felt
its decision was bolstered by the "apparent historical acceptance" of such
entries and the fact that numerous other states had statutes validating en-
tries to arrest.
The United States Supreme Court reversed both convictions. The
Court held that absent exigent circumstances, police officers must have an
arrest warrant before entering the home of a suspect to arrest him.1 4
Payton is significant because it renders unconstitutional a practice fol-
lowed in a majority of the states and a practice apparently accepted at
common law.' 5 Furthermore, while warrantless arrest related activity has
historically been thought constitutional, this decision suggests a new will-
ingness on the Court's part to scrutinize such activity and, if consistent with
traditional fourth amendment analysis, to require warrant protection. 16
Finally, the Court's analysis lends guidance in answering a related con-
stitutional question: whether police must have a search warrant before
entering the home of a third person to arrest a suspect. 17
Prior to Payton, the courts, both state and federal, differed on
whether a warrant was needed to enter a suspect's home to effect an
arrest.18 Initially, such entries were thought valid at common law and were
not judicially questioned. Recently, however, the Supreme Court had sug-
gested that the constitutionality of the warrantless entry was open to ques-
13. 423 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1976).
14. 445 U.S. at 576. The Payton ruling, of course, renders invalid any arrest
or search resulting from the illegal entry. See 445 U.S. at 591-92 & n.34.
15. 445 U.S. at 591-600. The Court noted that 24 states permitted war-
rantless entries to arrest in the suspect's home; 11 states had taken no position;
and 15 prohibited them. The majority found the common law ambiguous, but
the dissent viewed the common law as firmly accepting the view that warrantless
entries were lawful. 445 U.S. at 611 (White, J., dissenting).
16. Warrantless felony arrests based upon probable cause have long been
considered lawful. Not until United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424 (1976),
however, did the Court so hold. Prior to Payton, the Court had avoided the war-
rantless entry to arrest question. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
433, 476 (1971).
17. This question was left open in Payton. 445 U.S. at 583. The Court has
granted certiorari to hear Steagald v. United States, which presents the issue. 101
S. Ct. 71 (1980).
18. 445 U.S. at 575 & nn.3 & 4.
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tion9 and subsequent lower court decisions had, for the most part, applied
a warrant requirement. 20
One difficult aspect of this area of search and seizure law is that the
Payton situation involves features of both searches and arrests.2 An entry
made to arrest clearly involves a search for the person, but the supposed
primary purpose of the entry is to arrest. 22 There would be no difficulty
under a literal reading of the fourth amendment, which on its face applies
equally to searches and arrests, 23 to find that a warrant requirement exists
for an entry to make an arrest. There is, however, a firmly entrenched
dichotomy between the two which was recently reaffirmed in United States
v. Watson.24 Under this tradition, warrantless arrests are presumptively
19. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43-44 (1976) (White, J., concur-
ring); id. at 45-46 (Marshall, J., dissenting); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S.
411, 419 (1976); id. at 432-33 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 433 (Stewart, J.,
concurring); id. at 553-54 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.
103, 113 n.13 (1975); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-81 (1971);
id. at 492 (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 511 n. 1 (White, J., dissenting); Jones v.
United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499-500 (1958); Comment, ForcibleEntry to Effect a
Warrantless Arrest- The Eroding Protection of the Castle, 82 DICK. L. REV. 167,
174-78 (1977); Comment, Warrantless Arrests in Homes: Another Crisis for the
Fourth Amendment, 7 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 93, 96-100 (1978); Note, Warrantless
Entry to Arrest: A Practical Solution to a Fourth Amendment Problem, 1978 U.
ILL. L.F. 655, 655-59.
20. See 445 U.S. at 575 & n.4. The Court in Payton noted that five of the
federal circuits, including the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Houle, 603 F.2d
1297, 1300 (8th Cir. 1979), had held the entries unconstitutional. Three others
assumed, without deciding, that such entries were unconstitutional and one had
upheld the entries without discussing the issue. 445 U.S. at 575 & n.4. See
generally Constitutional Law-Fourth Amendment- Warrantless In-Home Ar-
rest in Absence of Exigent Circumstances Violates Fourth Amendment, United
States v. Houle, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 1133.
21. The traditional search warrant authorizes the search for and seizure of
property based on probable cause, i.e., facts and circumstances which would
cause a man of reasonable caution to believe that items subject to seizure are
within the place to be searched. The arrest warrant authorizes the search for and
seizure of a person based on probable cause, i.e., facts and circumstances which
would cause a man of reasonable caution to believe a crime has been committed
and that the suspect committed it. See 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, A
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 3.1 (1978). The Payton question
centers on the extent to which the police can search for a suspect under the
authority of an arrest warrant.
22. 445 U.S. at 587-89.
23. See note 9 supra.
24. 423 U.S. 411 (1976). "Logic therefore would seem to dictate that arrests
be subject to the warrant requirement at least to the same extent as searches. But
logic sometimes must defer to history and experience." Id. at 429 (Powell, J., con-
curring).
For somewhat differing views on the breath of this dichotomy, compare Note,
426 [Vol. 46
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constitutional" and warrantless searches and seizures of property are
presumptively unconstitutional. 26 The difficulty, therefore, is in deciding
which set of fourth amendment principles apply, i.e., which presumption
arises when a suspect's home is entered to effect his arrest.
The New York court was persuaded that the issue was best resolved
under arrest principles. Important to its decision was the conclusion that
the entries involved such a minimal intrusion that there was no reason to
distinguish an arrest in public from one made in the home. 27 Thus, the
court concluded that a warrantless entry to arrest was presumptively
constitutional.
The Supreme Court, however, analyzed Payton under those principles
traditionally applied to questions involving the search for and seizure of
property. 2 The Court began with the propositions that an arrest is
"quintessentially a seizure"29 and that "[t]he simple language of the
Amendment applies equally to seizures of persons and to seizures of prop-
erty." 30 A central factor resulting in this approach was that entry was made
into the suspect's home. The majority observed that "physical entry of the
home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment
is directed," and noted that the Court had "long adhered to the view that
the warrant procedure minimizes the danger of needless intrusions of that
sort. ' 3 1 To distinguish Watson from the question presented, the Court said
that while warrantless seizures in plain view are presumptively valid, sear-
ches and seizures inside the home are not.32 The distinction, according to
the majority, applied equally when the seizure of a person was involved. 33
In the Court's opinion both entries to search for property and entries to
search for persons share "the same fundamental characteristic: the breach
of the entrance to an individual's home." 34 Accordingly, the Court re-
supra note 19, at 660 with Rotenberg & Tanzer, Searching for the Person to be
Seized, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 56, 56-60, 70 (1974).
25. Until Payton, this Court had not required police to have an arrest war-
rant to make arrests in public or in the home. See United States v. Santana, 427
U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976) (warrantless arrest on private property held constitutional
when suspect seen in plain view); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 414
(1976) (warrantless public arrest held constitutional).
26. 445 U.S. at 586. See also United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 427
(1976); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971).
27. 45 N.Y.2d at 310-11, 380 N.E.2d at 229, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 400.
28. 445 U.S. at 585.
29. Id. (quoting United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. at 428 (Powell, J., con-
curring)).
30. 445 U.S. at 585.
31. Id. at 585-86. See also Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14
(1948) (quoted by the Court in Payton, 445 U.S. at 586 n.24).
32. 445 U.S. at 586-89.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 589.
19811 427
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jected the New York court's suggestion that entries to arrest are significant-
ly less intrusive than those made to search.35 Thus, the Court concluded,
"In terms that apply equally to seizures of property and seizures of persons,
the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance of the house.
Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be
crossed without a warrant. 36
The Court did not ignore the New York court's characterization of the
issue as one best solved by arrest principles. The Court considered and
ultimately rejected considerations which in Watson led to the conclusion
that warrantless arrests in public places are constitutional.3 7 The majority
decided there was no well-settled common law view that warrantless en-
tries to arrest are lawful.38 They rejected the contention that there is a
clear consensus among the states adhering to such a common law view.
The Court also denied an argument that Congress had expressed its judg-
ment that warrantless entries to arrest are reasonable.3 9 Furthermore, the
vitality of the Watson reasoning, criticized by some legal scholars as lack-
ing merit as a method of fourth amendment analysis, 40 was cast in doubt
by the Payton majority's suggestion that history and past experience alone
will not be enough to overcome a warrant requirement otherwise man-
dated by traditional fourth amendment analysis. 41 This would seem
especially true where the Watson factors are not overwhelmingly present. 42
An interesting aspect of Payton is that the Court stopped short of com-
pleting its search analysis by requiring only an arrest warrant and not a
search warrant. 43 An arrest warrant, it reasoned, was "sufficient to inter-
pose the magistrate's determination of probable cause between the zealous
officer and the citizen." 44 This result is not, at first glance, logical4 if the
35. Id.
36. Id. at 590.
37. Id. at 601.
38. Id. at 591-98. See note 15 supra.
39. 445 U.S. at 598-601.
40. See, e.g., 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 21, § 5.1(b). LaFave notes, "The
Court's opinion in Watson is remarkable for its lack of analysis." Id. § 5.1(b), at
227. See Note, supra note 19, at 660. See also United States v. Watson, 423 U.S.
at 436-56 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
41. "In this case, however, neither history nor this Nation's experience re-
quires us to disregard the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has
been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic." 445 U.S. at
601.
42. Indeed, there are probably few fourth amendment questions on which
the common law and the states have taken such a unanimous view.
43. 445 U.S. at 602-03.
44. Id. at 602.
45. Subject to a few exceptions, the search for and seizure of property within
the home has repeatedly been held unconstitutional in absence of a search war-
rant. See note 26 and accompanying text supra. In Payton, the Court concluded
428 [Vol. 46
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fourth amendment indeed "applies equally to seizures of persons and to
seizures of property,""46 but other considerations might justify it.47 The
concurring opinion suggests that the Court implicitly balanced the govern-
ment's interest in apprehending suspects against the citizen's privacy
rights.4 8 The result might also be justified by decisions which have stated
that the fourth amendment protects the citizen's "legitimate expectation
of privacy. 49 A person inside his home no doubt has a "legitimate expecta-
that an entry into the home to seize a person merits the same constitutional pro-
tection. 445 U.S. at 587-89. Were that true, a search warrant would also be re-
quired in the latter situation. The Court, however, did not reach that result. Id.
at 602-03.
46. 445 U.S. at 585.
47. See notes 48-55 and accompanying text infra.
48. 445 U.S. at 603 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
49. Payton is surprising for not using a "legitimate expectation of privacy"
analysis as used in many recent fourth amendment cases. In Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the Court decided that agents violated the
defendant's fourth amendment rights when they attached a "bug" to the outside
of a telephone booth and listened to his conversation. The Court rejected the
Government's contention that the search was not illegal because there was no
physical entry into an area owned by the defendant. The Court stated that the
fourth amendment protects people, not places, and rejected the concept that the
scope of a defendant's protection from a search or seizure depended on property
concepts. The Court stated, "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even
in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection....
But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected." Id. at 351-52 (citations omitted).
The majority concluded that the government's activity violated the privacy on
which the defendant "justifiably relied." Id. at 353.
Justice Harlan, in his concurrence, understood the Court to hold that the
defendant had a constitutionally protected "reasonable expectation of privacy."
Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). A person has this protected expectation, he
said, if he meets a "two-fold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an ac-
tual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one
that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable'." Id. at 360-61 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
Subsequent decisions have often been based on Harlan's view of Katz. See
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 100 S. Ct. 2556, 2561 (1980); United States v. Salvucci,
100 S. Ct. 2547, 2552-55 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-43 & 143
n.12 (1978).
While Katz stands for the proposition that property interests are not deter-
minative in deciding whether one has a legitimate expectation of privacy, they are
an important factor. The Court in Rakas noted that "one who owns or lawfully
possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation
of privacy by virtue of this right to exclude." Id. at 143 n. 12. Since the home entry
is the chief evil against which the wording of the fourth amendment is directed, in
most instances one will have a "legitimate expectation of privacy" in his own
home. Id. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 591 (1978); United States v.
1981]
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tion of privacy" notwithstanding the fact that he is suspected of criminal
activity.-0 An entry into the home to arrest is an invasion of the person's ex-
pectation of privacy which cannot be justified in absence of a warrant. 5
Such warrantless entries are per se "unreasonable" and thus violate the
fourth amendment. Once a neutral and detached magistrate has deter-
mined the existence of probable cause to believe a person has committed a
felony, however, an entry for the limited purpose to arrest is thought a
reasonable invasion of the suspect's privacy interests. 52 The Court noted
that if
there is sufficient evidence of a citizen's participation in a felony to
persuade a judicial officer that his arrest is justified, it is constitu-
tionally reasonable to require him to open up his doors to the of-
ficers of the law. Thus, for Fourth Amendment purposes, an arrest
warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the
limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives
when there is reason to believe the suspect is within. 5
When the suspect is afforded a magistrate's determination of the facts,
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 6-13 (1977); Caldwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 588-92
(1974); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48 (1970).
The fevel of one's expectation of privacy also has been quantified in degrees.
See Caldwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. at 588-92, which implies that one has lesser ex-
pectation of privacy in his car which warrants less protection than, e.g., the ex-
pectation of privacy one has in his own home. See notes 97-99 and accompanying
text infra.
50. A person does not forfeit his expectation of privacy simply because he
commits or is suspected of committing a crime. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,
391 (1978); United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 422 (2d Cir. 1978).
51. See United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 422-25 (2d Cir. 1978), where
the court employed the expectation of privacy analysis to the warrantless entry to
arrest question and reached the Payton result.
52. 445 U.S. at 602-03. An entry for the limited purpose of making an arrest
when based on a reasonable belief that the suspect is within may be thought
reasonable on a number of grounds. It may be thought that with an arrest war-
rant no search warrant is required because, in this situation, the scope and fre-
quency of the entry will be so limited that the burden of requiring a search war-
rant to the legitimate needs of law enforcement far outweighs the suspect's in-
terest in privacy. This is a specie of the balancing test mentioned in the concur-
ring opinion. See 445 U.S. at 603. See also note 69 infra. Another alternative
analysis is that once an arrest warrant is issued then the suspect has a lesser expec-
tation of privacy which receives sufficient protection because the police must have
a reasonable belief he is within his home, and further, because the scope of the
entry and search is limited to circumstances related to making the arrest. See
Caldwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 588-92 (1974). Finally, the least viable alter-
native analysis is that once an arrest warrant is issued the suspect has no expecta-
tion of privacy as it concerns entries to his home to arrest. But see Mincey v.
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 391-95 (1978).
53. 445 U.S. at 602-03.
430 [Vol. 46
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there is less danger of an arbitrary and capricious invasion by the police
and one of the basic purposes of the fourth amendment is fulfilled. 54 Thus,
under a legitimate expectation of privacy analysis, the fourth amendment
is satisfied when police who wish to enter the suspect's home have an arrest
warrant and probable cause5 to believe that the suspect is within.
The implications of Payton in other fourth amendment areas are
unclear. 6 Nevertheless, Payton does present a basis on which another con-
stitutional question, soon to be decided by the Court in Steagald v. United
States,57 can be analyzed. That question "concern[s] the authority of the
police, without either an arrest or search warrant, to enter a third party's
home to arrest a suspect."58 Since Payton requires warrant and probable
cause protection in situations involving the suspect's home, it seems at least
as much protection will be afforded the third party. Indeed, the majority
of courts require an arrest warrant and probable cause to believe the
suspect is in the third party's residence before such entries can be made.5 9
54. Id. at 582 n.17.
55. It is not entirely clear that police officers must have probable cause to
believe the suspect is within his home. The Court says that the officers must have
"reason to believe"; however, the difference between the two standards may not
be significant. See 445 U.S. at 616 & n.13 (White, J., dissenting); United States v.
Steagald, 606 F.2d 540, 544 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 71 (1980).
But see id. at 548-49 (Kravitch, J., dissenting).
56. Payton, holding that arrest-related activity will no longer be free from
the imposition of warrant requirements, represents a significant departure from
past constitutional practice and thus much of the law concerning arrest-related
activity is thrown into question. In view of this, the Payton Court should have
more clearly stated the reasoning employed in reaching the arrest warrant re-
quirement. Since the "legitimate expectation of privacy" test has been increas-
ingly used in fourth amendment cases, an analysis of that type would have been
most useful to lawyers and judges seeking to apply the Payton decision to related
fourth amendment questions. See notes 90-102 and accompanying text infra.
57. Steagald v. United States, 606 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted,
101 S. Ct. 71 (1980).
58. 445 U.S. at 583.
59. The circuits which have decided or discussed this issue are not in agree-
ment. Most appear to embrace the arrest warrant plus probable cause rule.
Direct holdings requiring or rejecting a search warrant are rare because often the
existence of exigent circumstances or lack of probable cause has made it un-
necessary for the court to decide the issue. See, e.g., United States v. Hammond,-
585 F.2d 26, 28 n.1 (2d Cir. 1978) (dicta noting that a search warrant may not
always be required; excellent review of authorities); United States v. Williams,
612 F.2d 735, 738 (3d Cir. 1979) (dicta interpreting Fisher v. Votlz, 496 F.2d 333
(3d Cir. 1974), as requiring an arrest warrant plus probable cause), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 935 (1980); Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914, 928-30 (3d Cir.
1974) (dicta that absent exigent circumstances a search warrant is required), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 909 (1975); Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197, 201-06 (4th Cir.
1966) (court enjoined search of third person's home unless police had an arrest
9
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But while the suspect under the Payton arrest warrant rule suffers no inva-
sion of the privacy of his home until a neutral and detached magistrate's
determination of probable cause, the third party would have no such pro-
tection. The issue, then, is whether the Court should require further pro-
tection for the third party in the form of a search warrant. 60
warrant plus probable cause; left open the question of whether a search warrant re-
quired); United States v. Steagald, 606 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1979) (arrest warrant
plus probable cause), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 71 (1980); United States v.
Cravero, 545 F.2d 406, modified on reconsideration, 545 F.2d 420, 421 (5th Cir.
1976) (arrest warrant plus probable cause), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 983 (1977);
United States v. Sumlin, 567 F.2d 684, 687 n.1 (6th Cir. 1977) (dicta that a search
warrant may be required), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978); United States v.
McKinney, 379 F.2d 259, 262-63 (6th Cir. 1967) (arrest warrant plus probable
cause); Rice v. Wolff, 513 F.2d 1280, 1292 & n.7 (8th Cir. 1975) (court indicates
arrest warrant plus probable cause required, at a minimum, and leaves open
question of whether a search warrant is required), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d
1343, 1350 (9th Cir. 1978) (arrest warrant sufficient if it describes place to be
searched and person to be seized); United States v. Erb, 596 F.2d 412, 419 (10th
Cir. 1979) (unclear if search warrant is required absent exigent circumstances),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 848 (1980); United States v. Harper, 550 F.2d 610, 613-14
(10th Cir.) (arrest warrant plus probable cause held sufficient), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 837 (1977); United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146, 159 n.45 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(dicta interpreting United States v. Brown, 467 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1972), as re-
quiring exigent circumstances when entry made upon arrest warrant plus pro-
bable cause).
Missouri's view on warrantless entries of the homes of third parties is unclear.
In State v. Novak, 428 S.W.2d 585, 591-93 (Mo. 1968), the court construed
RSMO § 544.200 (1959) (current version at RSMo § 544.200 (1978)), a statute
which applies equally to the entry of the suspect's home and entry of the third
party's home. While the statute purports to give police almost unlimited power to
enter homes to arrest, the court seemed only to excuse the lack of a search warrant
when officers entered the suspect's home because there were exceptional cir-
cumstances. This ruling was upheld in Novak v. Swenson, 357 F. Supp. 901, 904
(E.D. Mo.), affd mem., 489 F.2d 760 (8th Cir. 1973), on the grounds that of-
ficers had probable cause to believe the suspect committed a crime and probable
cause to believe he was within his home. But cf. State v. Tomlin, 467 S.W.2d 918,
919-20 (Mo. 1971) (court applies statute without considering whether search war-
rant required).
For an interesting application of Missouri's statute to the entry of the third per-
son's home question, see United States v. Boyer, 574 F.2d 951, 952-55 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 967 (1978); note 102 infra.
RSMO § 544.200 (1978) provides: "To make an arrest in criminal actions, the
officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a dwelling house or
other building, or any other enclosure, if, after notice of his office and purpose,
he be refused admittance." Of course, this statute must be considered unconstitu-
tional after Payton.
60. A few courts have stated that a search warrant is required. Houtari v.
Vanderport, 380 F. Supp. 645, 649 (D. Minn. 1974) (dicta); State v. Jones, 274
10
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It is clear from Payton that the analysis of the "entry to a third party's
home to arrest" question should begin with the rules applicable to the
search for and seizure of property in the home. Normally, warrantless sear-
ches and seizures inside a home are unconstitutional. 61 Thus, presumably
a search warrant will be required. As in Payton, however, other reasons
which may justify something less than a search warrant requirement must
be considered.
Although Payton held that an arrest warrant implies authority to enter
the suspect's home, it does not follow that the arrest warrant gives such
authority with respect to the homes of third persons. An arrest warrant
which implied authority to search for a person anywhere the police think
he can be found would be in conflict with the basic historical purpose of
the fourth amendment. The fourth amendment was, in great measure,
adopted to restrict police activity which occurred in the American colonies
under the authority of general warrants.6 2 Those warrants empowered of-
ficers to search anywhere they suspected illegal items to be.6 3 The danger
of massive house searches, much like those conducted under authority of
general warrants, exists if officers are allowed to search any home for a
suspect named in an arrest warrant. 64
Consideration of the third party's legitimate expectation of privacy
also cuts in favor of a search warrant requirement. While the Payton con-
clusion with respect to the suspect's home can be reconciled with the ex-
pectation of privacy test, 65 the arrest warrant plus probable cause rule as
applied to searches of the third party's residence cannot. The third party
has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his home even though police of-
ficers have probable cause to believe a criminal suspect can be found
therein.6 6 In the Payton situation, the suspect's expectation of privacy is
N.W.2d 273, 275-76 (Iowa 1979) (dicta); England v. State, 488 P.2d 1347,
1348-49 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971); State v. Werth, 18 Wash. App. 530, 536-37,
571 P.2d 941, 944 (1977).
61. See cases cited note 26 supra.
62. 445 U.S. at 583-85 & 583 n.21.
63. Id.
64. See Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966). In this case over
300 homes were searched by officers seeking to execute arrest warrants on two
dangerous suspects. The court enjoined further searches by the police unless they
had probable cause to believe the suspects were within the home to be searched.
Id. at 206.
A requirement that police have probable cause to believe a suspect is within
the third party's home is some protection against massive searches; the fourth
amendment, however, additionally mandates that a magistrate appraise the facts
which police believe justify an entry of the home. See, e.g., 445 U.S. at 602; Jones
v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498 (1958); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,
13-14 (1948). See also note 66 infra.
65. See notes 49-55 and accompanying text supra.
66. Officers can have probable cause to believe the suspect is within a
residence without being certain. See note 21 supra. If there is probable cause the 11
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protected by the issuance of the arrest warrant.6 7 The third party's expec-
tation of privacy, however, is not protected by the arrest warrant and thus
can only be protected by a magistrate's determination that probable cause
exists to believe the suspect is within the third party's home. 68 Therefore,
unless the government's interest in consummating arrests is so important
that the warrant requirement can be dispensed with, a search warrant is
required under the expectation of privacy analysis.6 9
Since such entries are clearly arrest related, the Watson considerations
should also be examined. They do not, however, afford a persuasive argu-
ment against a search warrant requirement. The common law appears
unsettled. 70 As in Payton, the applicable common law rules are concerned
primarily with the civil liability of officers who enter a third party's home
to arrest a suspect. 71 One common law commentator, Hale, said that the
officers were liable for trespass unless they in fact found the suspect on the
premises. 72 Thus, while no search warrant was required, this restrictive
rule indicates that the entry of a third party's home was not encouraged at
common law. The majority of states do not appear to require search war-
search is not infirm simply because the officers do not find the suspect upon entry.
For an example of this concept as applied to warrantless entries to arrest, see
Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914, 928-30 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 909 (1975).
Additionally, one does not lose his expectation of privacy once officers have
established probable cause to believe items subject to seizure are within his
home-a warrant is still required. See 445 U.S. at 588 n.26 (quoting Jones v.
United States, 357 U.S. 493, 497 (1958)): "'It is settled doctrine that probable
cause for belief that certain articles subject to seizure are in a dwelling cannot of
itself justify a search without a warrant."' In Payton, the court indicated that this
held true when officers were seeking persons as well as property. Id. at 588-89.
67. 445 U.S. at 602-03. See notes 49-52 and accompanying text supra.
68. See notes 62-64 and accompanying text supra.
69. The government's interest could conceivably be so strong that the third
party would have no legitimate expectation of privacy because, under the Katz
test, his expectation would not be one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable. See note 49 supra. See also text accompanying note 48 supra. The
Court is unlikely, however, to embrace this argument. See United States v. United
States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 318-24 (1972) (Court rejects contention that
the government's interest in matters relating to domestic national security was
strong enough to dispense with the warrant requirement).
70. There is little common law authority available which distinguishes war-
rantless entries of the suspect's home to arrest from those made in a third party's
home. The Court clearly indicated that the law as to the former situation was
unsettled. 445 U.S. at 591-98. See Comment, The Constitutionality of War-
rantless Home Arrests, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1550, 1551-53 (1978). See also note 15
supra.
71. 445 U.S. at 592.
72. 2 W. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 117 (1736). See also Wilgus, Arrest
Without a Warrant (pts. 1-2), 22 MICH. L. REV. 541, 798, 800-04 (1924).
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rants. Payton makes clear, however, that this fact is not dispositive. 73
Federal statutes afford no basis for an argument that Congress has ex-
pressed its view that such entries are reasonable. 74 In short, these con-
siderations do not compel resolution of the issue one way or another.
A real obstacle, to a search warrant requirement is the fear that it
would put undue restraint on law enforcement activity.7 5 Indeed, to many
courts deciding cases involving entries into third party's homes, practical
considerations are paramount.7 6 One recent decision, State v. Jordan,77 is
illustrative. The Oregon Supreme Court inferred that while maximum
protection could be afforded the citizen by requiring a search warrant, this
would constitute an intolerable handicap for legitimate law
enforcement. 8 Primarily, the court saw a difference in the seizures of per-
sons from seizures of things in that "[a] suspect will not stay in one place; he
will attempt to avoid capture. And this inherent mobility to escape often
presents unforeseeable dangers that necessitate swift police action. '79 The
court reasoned that the constitutional requirement of reasonableness did
not mandate that it "handicap police apprehension efforts by requiring of-
ficers to wait at the threshold to return for a warrant to search each time
the suspect flees to hide in another house or apartment." 80
There are counterarguments to suggestions that suspects are in-
herently more mobile than things and that a search warrant requirement
would unduly hamper law enforcement. In the first instance, it is not
abundantly clear that persons will disappear any faster than certain types
of evidence.8 Also, the exigent circumstances and hot pursuit doctrines
are available in those situations in which it is truly impracticable for of-
ficers to obtain a warrant.812 On the other hand, some members of the
73. 445 U.S. at 600.
74. The Payton majority found no federal statute that reflected a congres-
sional determination that warrantless entries to arrest are reasonable. Id. at 601.
The dissent, however, believed that 18 U.S.C. §§ 3052, 3109 (1976), supported an
opposite conclusion. 445 U.S. at 614-15 (White, J., dissenting).
75. E.g., 445 U.S. at 601; id. at 618-20 (White, J., dissenting); Watson v.
United States, 423 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1976); id. at 431-32 (Powell, J., concurring);
id. at 449-53 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
76. See, e.g., United States v. McKinney, 379 F.2d 259, 263 (6th Cir. 1967);
State v. Jordan, 288 Or. 391, -, 605 P.2d 646, 650-51 (1980).
77. 288 Or. 391, 605 P.2d 646 (1980).
78. Id. at., 605 P.2d at 650-51.
79. Id. at ., 605 P.2d at 651.
80. Id.
81. See 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 21, § 6.1(b).
82. According to the exigent circumstances doctrine, which includes hot
pursuit, a warrant to search is unnecessary when the delay in time required to
procure it could result in danger to the lives of the police or others or the destruc-
tion of evidence. See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976);
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1967); Dorman v. United States, 435
1981] 435
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Court seem reluctant to rely on these doctrines for, among other reasons,
the fear that there would be a flood of exigent circumstances litigation. 83
This fear, in part, stems from the view of some that arrest related activity
by its very nature presents recurring exigent circumstances problems.8 4
The Jordan majority's argument about practical considerations was
countered by the dissent which suggested that officers seeking an arrest
warrant could request authority to search third-party residences to be
noted on the arrest warrant.8 5 That authority, according to the dissent,
could be granted if officers established probable cause to expect the
suspect to be at one or more specified residences in the future. 6 While not
formally a search warrant, the dissent noted that
[t]he constitutional warrant requirement is not a matter of forms.
Its crux is that a magistrate has made a decision to authorize an
unconsented entry and search, upon his independent judgment
that the importance of making the arrest and the probability of
finding the person to be arrested justify it.87
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in United
States v. Prescott, has implied in dicta that it would require similar protec-
tion for the third party. 8 If officers are allowed to seek what is, in
substance, an anticipatory search warrant,89 then some of the inconven-
ience to law enforcement could be alleviated. This possibility, then, cuts in
favor of a search warrant requirement.
Another impediment to a search warrant requirement is the Court's
reluctance to expand the application of the exclusionary rule.90 An argu-
ment can be made, however, that a search warrant requirement in the
third-party entry situation will not result in added application of the rule
as to the suspect. In Rakas v. Illinois,91 the Court held that a defendant
can only benefit from the exclusionary rule if his personal fourth amend-
F.2d 385, 391-96 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See generally Kelder & Statman, supra note 6,
at 1041-47.
83. 445 U.S. at 620 (White, J., dissenting); United States v. Watson, 423
U.S. 411, 423-24 (1976).
84. See cases cited note 83 supra.
85. 288 Or. at _ , 605 P.2d at 655-56 (Linde, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at __ , 605 P.2d at 655 (Linde, J., dissenting).
87. Id. (Linde, J., dissenting).
88. 581 F.2d 1343, 1350 (9th Cir. 1978).
89. An anticipatory search warrant is based on probable cause to believe an
item subject to seizure will be in a certain place in the future as opposed to the
normal requirement of probable cause to believe the item is presently there. 1 W.
LAFAVE, supra note 21, § 3.7(c).
90. See 445 U.S. at 618-19 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 620-21' (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting). Opposition to the exclusionary rule's operation is also manifested
in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 137-38 (1978).
91. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
[Vol. 46
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ment rights are violated. 92 The defendant must show a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in the area searched and an illegal invasion of that
privacy.9 3 Rakas rejected the proposition that a person who is merely
"legitimately on the premises" of a third party always has a legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy.94 Similarly, the Court rejected the theory that per-
sons who are the "target" of law enforcement efforts may always assert the
exclusionary rule.9 5 The scope of one's legitimate expectation of privacy
must be defined on a case-by-case basis, 96 but Payton suggests that the in-
vasion of any privacy interest the suspect does have in the third party's
residence would not be one on which he could assert fourth amendment
rights. The suspect named in an arrest warrant probably has the highest
expectation of privacy when in his own home. 97 This is because of the
special emphasis the fourth amendment places on protection of the home.
Payton makes clear, however, that an arrest warrant and probable cause
to believe the suspect is within his home justify an invasion of his expecta-
tion of privacy in the form of an entry to arrest.9 8 Therefore, an entry into
an area where the suspect arguably has a lesser expectation of privacy, i. e.,
a third person's home, solely on an arrest warrant and probable cause
would also appear lawful as to the suspect.9 9 Assuming a search warrant
was also required but not obtained prior to the entry, the third party could
benefit from the exclusionary rule because his legitimate expectation of
92. Id. at 133-34.
93. Id. at 139-40; Rawlings v. Kentucky, 100 S. Ct. 2556, 2562 (1980); id. at
2564-65 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
94. 439 U.S. at 148-49.
95. Id. at 133-37.
96. Id. at 143-48; id. at 150-56 (Powell, J., concurring). See note 49 supra.
97. See note 49 supra.
98. 445 U.S. at 602-03. See notes 49-53 and accompanying text supra.
99. From the suspect's standpoint, the Payton rule may suggest that once an
arrest warrant has been issued for him then the police may search anywhere they
have probable cause to believe he may be. See note 52 supra.
Alternatively, even an arrest warrant may not be necessary because a person
might not have any legitimate expectation of privacy if he is a casual visitor in a
third party's home. This, for example, may be true if he is attending a social func-
tion at the residence. It may not be true, however, if he is hiding in the attic with
the subjective purpose of avoiding capture. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 100 S. Ct.
2556, 2561 (1980) (Court found petitioner did not take normal precautions to
maintain privacy, hence, no subjective expectation of privacy); Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U.S. 128, 144-48 (1978) (whether person legitimately on premises is merely a
factor in determining whether he has a legitimate expectation of privacy); id. at
150-57 (Powell, J., dissenting); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967)
(suspect in public telephone booth who attempted to keep conversation private
had legitimate expectation of privacy). See also note 49 supra. If the suspect in
the third party's residence is found to have no legitimate expectation of privacy,
then under Rakas, he cannot assert the exclusionary rule regardless of the fact
that the officers had no arrest warrant. See' text accompanying note 93 supra.
1981] 437
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privacy was wrongfully invaded. 00 The suspect, however, could not. The
difference in treatment is warranted because the suspect has had the
benefit of a magistrate's determination that an invasion of his privacy in-
terests is justified while the third party, in absence of a search warrant, has
not. This result does not suggest that the entry is lawful but rather that the
suspect cannot vicariously assert the third party's rights. The Court has
made it clear that, in its view, the third party's ability to assert the exclu-
sionary rule if evidence is found against him or to bring state and federal
civil suits is a sufficient deterrent against illegal searches and seizures. '01
Thus, the Rakas decision would allow the Court to afford the third party
the protection of a search warrant without expanding the operation of the
exclusionary rule as to the suspect. 02
Analysis of the "entry to a third party's residence to arrest" question
leads then to a search warrant requirement. Unlike Payton, in this situa-
tion an arrest warrant plus probable cause rule cannot be harmonized with
the applicable rules of search and seizure law. A search warrant require-
ment possibly would create some practical problems for law enforcement,
but there are doctrines available, e.g., exigent circumstances, which can
be utilized to reduce such problems. To the extent that all warrant re-
quirements pose a handicap on the police, the practical problem argu-
ment loses some force. At any rate, such considerations should not override
the basic fourth amendment principle that a magistrate must determine
the existence of probable cause before the police may enter the home of a
private citizen.
The upcoming Steagald case10 3 presents the Court with an opportunity
to refine the method of analysis applicable to arrest related questions.
Because, under Rakas, the Court relies so heavily on the "legitimate expec-
tation of privacy" test to determine whether a citizen's fourth amendment
rights have been violated, it should employ similar reasoning on these
arrest related questions. After all, whether the criminal defendant can
successfully procure exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is the para-
100. See notes 66-69 and accompanying text supra.
101. United States v. Salvucci, 100 S. Ct. 2547, 2554 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U.S. 128, 134, 137 (1978). The third-party resident probably has no right to
resist physically an illegal entry to arrest a suspect. See United States v. Ferrone,
438 F.2d 381, 389-90 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1008 (1971); State v. Hat-
ton, 116 Ariz. 142, 147-48, 568 P.2d 1040, 1045-46 (1977). But see People v.
Cedeno, 218 Cal. App. 2d 213, 227, 32 Cal. Rptr. 246, 255 (1963).
102. See generally United States v. Boyer, 574 F.2d 951 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 967 (1978). The court of appeals held that the suspect could not
challenge an entry made to a third party's home to arrest him when the police
complied with RSMo § 544.200 (1969) (now 1978). See note 59 supra. The court
indicated, however, that the third party might be able to assert the exclusionary
rule or bring civil suit. 574 F.2d at 954 n.9; id. at 955 (Ross, J., concurring).
103. 606 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 71 (1980).
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